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This chapter explores the possibility of an alliance between Deleuze’s philosophy and feminist philosophy with respect to ethics. I begin by specifying some of the general points of convergence between Deleuzian ethics and feminist ethics. In the second section, I turn away from feminist ethics in particular to consider feminist engagement with Deleuze’s (and Deleuze and Guattari’s) work; in this section of the paper, I describe the central criticisms of Deleuze offered by feminist philosophers and point out the aspects of his thought that have been valuable for feminist theorizing. In order to respond to what I take to be the overarching concern feminists have about Deleuze’s philosophy, the third section develops a proposal for a Deleuzian conception of ethics that is able to do (much of) what feminists require of an ethical theory. 

1. Ethics Away from Tradition 

Feminist ethics emerged as a unique subdiscipline in the 1970s and 80s in particular through the work of Nel Noddings and Carol Gilligan.​[1]​ While it has become a diverse field with various perspectives and threads of interest, I will attempt briefly to draw a general picture of the concerns that animate it so that we might see in what ways Deleuzian ethics and feminist ethics may coincide. At the core of feminist approaches to ethics is both a critical approach to ethics, criticizing gender bias and the attendant gender-associated dualisms within mainstream ethics and the history of ethics, and a reconstructive endeavor to provide a more adequate ethical theory.​[2]​ This simultaneously critical and constructive approach developed in diverse ways: some theorists focused on bringing to light issues and domains of moral concern that had previously been overlooked because of their association with women (the home, mothering and domestic work, sexual violence, abortion, etc.); some charted and criticized the gender-bias present in traditional ethical theories, while others worked to elaborate ‘what was now beginning to be claimed as a distinctively feminine moral experience of sensibility’ (Jaggar 1991: 81). Ultimately, most feminist ethicists came to focus on the inadequacy of these traditional paradigms and construct new models with varying degrees of continuity with the tradition.​[3]​ Deleuze's approach to ethics is likewise critical, following the Nietzschean trajectory that rejects transcendent moral norms in favor of immanent and plastic principles, and constructive, especially in its emphasis on creativity and novelty. Thus, both Deleuzian and feminist ethics share a strong critical perspective on traditional ethical theories and develop alternative understandings of ethics and ethical thinking that operate as counter-movements to this tradition.​[4]​ 	
	Beyond this fundamental yet broad commonality, a Deleuzian ethic and feminist ethics converge in at least four other respects. These four points of convergence will enable us to discern in more specific terms how Deleuzian ethics and feminist ethics are simultaneously critical and constructive, as well as in what ways they may be in tension with one another. Although the overarching aim of this section is to elaborate a picture of ethics that addresses both Deleuzian and feminist concerns, in the process of delineating these commonalities I will also point out how their orientations differ and will not seek to minimize these differences. Such differences may ultimately be fruitful for developing alternative ways of using both Deleuzian and feminist concepts.
First, both articulate an understanding of ethics that is rooted in and grows out of experience rather than being purified of experiential elements. From a feminist perspective, the desire is to remedy the occlusion of women’s experiences throughout the history of ethics by developing an understanding of ethics that either significantly encompasses or is even grounded in women’s ethical experiences.​[5]​ In Deleuze's thought, ethics is itself a matter of experiencing the world and the self in a certain way. In terms of historical influence, Deleuze’s conception of ethics is formed primarily through readings of the Stoics, Spinoza, and Nietzsche. In his book on Spinoza’s practical philosophy, he defines ethics as ‘a typology of immanent modes of existence,’ a definition that emphasizes that he regards ethics not as supplying standards for judgment but as a practice through which one invents for oneself better ways of living (Deleuze 1988: 23). Following Nietzsche, he considers valuing and evaluating as the primary ethical activities: through living, one values and how one lives defines what one values. Ethics consists of distinguishing between those affects, relations, ways of thinking, and, ultimately, ways of living that are life-affirming, joyous, and active and those that are life-negating, sad, and reactive. Thus, it is fundamentally a matter of experience and experimentation. Only through experimentation is one able to discern the differences between those things that can be said to be good for us and those that are bad for us, and devise for oneself such a typology of ways of living. For Deleuze, then, ethics is a question of ethology in the sense that it has to do with studying bodies – both animal and human – in terms of what they are capable of doing and undergoing, and evaluating those changes from within the experience of affecting and being affected (1988: 125).
Second, and related to the criteria that ethical valuation be grounded in experience, both are concerned to understand ethical comportment in terms of practices rather than in terms of adherence to abstract rules and forms of moral reasoning. One instance of this focus, although certainly not the only one, is the development of a feminist ethic of care.​[6]​ In her overview of care ethics, Virginia Held emphasizes two sides of care: care as a practice and care as a value. The value of care is one that originates to a certain extent in caring relations, namely those that are formative of us as individual subjects; we care and we value care because others have cared for us. The value of care, which incorporates other related values such as trust, sensitivity, and mutual concern, is a value that must be embodied in actual caring practices and relationships (Held 2004: 65). To hold care as a value and decline to incorporate it into one’s activities is really to fail to care. The domain of experience that is of particular concern for care ethicist is also similar to that of concern for Deleuze: concrete individuals in their singularity and in relations with other unique individuals. One clear point of difference is the role pre-individual singularities plays in Deleuze’s philosophy; while feminist care ethics is certainly interested in the constitutive nature of relations, their emphasis is on the constituted subject rather than the singularities that constitute it. Another dissimilarity concerns the care. While care is one of the central values in feminist ethics, it is absent from Deleuze’s ethics, which center on transformative relationships rather than caring ones per se.
A third commonality is a shared line of critique that focuses on a conventional understanding of ethical subjectivity that emphasizes autonomy, rationality, independence, impartiality, and self-mastery. For both Deleuze and feminist thinkers, this form of subjectivity is one that demands submission: submission to a norm of what it means to be an ‘good’ person, which implicitly determines the qualities of the virtuous as masculine ones, as well as obedience to moral law itself. For feminist philosophers, this ideal of a moral subject is both gender-biased and specious, and a comprehension of the centrality of relations in shaping ethical subjectivity is crucial to altering it. Deleuze’s critique of the subject also shifts the focus from the subject as autonomous substance to the relations that constitute it, whether these relations generate a molar identity or as a ‘fascinated self’ in a process of becoming. Likewise, his work continually seeks to upset the dualist thinking that underlies oppression, fabricating oppositional categories, constituting subjects in accordance with them, and elevating, for instance, men over women, rationality over emotion, or autonomy over heteronomy. In both cases, constructively criticizing such conventional norms involves undermining dualism and doing so via a focus on constitutive relations rather than ready-made beings. 
Lastly, both Deleuze and feminist theorists approach ethics in a way that is inherently political; the question of how to live ethically is fundamentally a political question. This point is closely connected to the previous one insofar as the conception of subjectivity under dispute is a political one; that is, one that advances the ends and interests of some at the expense of others. Consequently, both Deleuzian and feminist approaches to ethics are able to expand the scope of ethical concern not merely in the sense of ‘moral extensionism’ – extending moral consideration to non-human animals and nature, for instance – but in the sense of treating ethics as ethos, as a matter of a way of living rather than a discipline that sets about solving a discrete set of problems. Alison Jaggar makes this claim on the behalf of feminist ethics: ‘rather than being limited to a restricted ethical domain, feminist ethics has enlarged the traditional concerns of ethics’ (Jaggar 1991: 86). A Deleuzian approach does likewise. There is, then, some basis for thinking that Deleuze and feminism might ally when it comes to ethics.

2. Feminism Contra Deleuze?

To determine what form an alliance between Deleuze and feminism might take with respect to ethics, it will also be important to consider how feminist thinkers have directly appropriated and/or addressed Deleuze’s work. This section of the paper centers on the concept that has evoked the most debate and skepticism from feminist readers of Deleuze: becoming-woman. The feminist reception of Deleuze’s work in terms of this concept indicates that it is a potential roadblock to their alliance. Many feminist thinkers have been skeptical about the value of Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari’s work for feminism because of the implications of the idea of ‘becoming-woman.’ This notion, along with the view of desire with which it is paired, is regarded as quite problematic and seen as indicative of the usefulness of Deleuze’s work as a whole perhaps because it is one of the few points in his work where he addresses sex, sexuality, women, and femininity. The charges made against Deleuze and Guattari with respect to becoming-woman are varied: first, that they overemphasize a rather stereotypical rendering of femininity; second, that they appropriate femininity for the purposes of men’s becoming; third, that they consequently neglect women’s specificity by depicting femininity in this way; and, fourth, that they further disregard concrete women by focusing on a level of change that is abstract and detached from women’s experiences.​[7]​  These criticisms are quite serious ones: if the most significant treatment of women, sex, and sexuality in Deleuze’s work amounts to an effacement of women, then his thought is likely to be of little use to feminists.
Here, I will take Elizabeth Grosz’s summation of these feminist criticisms of Deleuze and Guattari as a starting point for assessing such objections. Grosz identifies three unresolved problems with Deleuze and Guattari’s work: 1) their apparent inattentiveness to the specificity of women and lack of awareness of their own masculine subject position, 2) the possibility that their account of desire and becoming still allows women to be taken as ‘the vehicles, the receptacles of men’s becomings,’ and 3) the fact that their account may, in effect, reterritorialize or restrict women’s progressive becomings by making them ‘part of a more universalist movement of becoming’ (Grosz 1994: 182). The third problem can be broken down into two parts. One reason for feminists to be apprehensive about ‘becoming’ is the possibility that women’s becomings in particular would get swept away in a greater flow of change and destabilization.​[8]​ It is worth noting that this particular worry appears to be less a worry that women would get lost, overlooked, or hindered in processes of untrammeled becoming, and more a worry about how women’s becomings and becomings in relation to femininty are configured in theory by Deleuze and Guattari. It is essentially a concern about the insensitivity of the philosopher and thus much akin to the first problem. The other aspect of this third problem is the idea of ‘a more universalist movement of becoming’ and the role played by such a movement. The concern here centers on what is taken to be the privileged role of the universal or absolute in relation to what appears to be a limited interest in the particular and concrete (especially the particularity of women). Thus, in conclusion, Grosz suggests that it will have to become ‘clearer what becoming-woman means for those beings who are women, as well as for those beings who are men,’ if the value of Deleuze and Guattari’s work for feminism is to become apparent (ibid). In the context of these skeptical assessments, I offer an alternative account of the process of becoming-woman that aims to do just that. 
Much has been written about this concept and its peculiar status in the chain of becomings that Deleuze and Guattari sketch in plateau ten of A Thousand Plateaus, and I do not intend to rehash well-covered terrain by speculating as to what kind of priority they accorded becoming-woman.​[9]​ Rather than defining it negatively by emphasizing in what it does not consist, I will focus on what becoming-woman means as a positive process by elaborating three distinctive components of the concept. The main concern will be to consider how it might pertain to women’s particularity: Is becoming-woman a process that ignores the specificity of women or is it rather a process that attends to that specificity? In what ways might it attend to that specificity? 
One component of becoming-woman is Deleuze and Guattari’s other concept of ‘becoming-minoritarian’ and the distinction they make between the major and the minor. Since ‘all becoming is a becoming-minoritarian[,]’ becoming always occurs in relation to a minor molar term – a woman or animal, for instance – that functions to destabilize the major term, a man or human being, correspondingly (1987: 291; 1980: 356). The identity categories that are ‘major’ (for instance, human, male, adult, white, rational) are defined as such in virtue of their dominance, the way they set the standards for the hierarchical terms of identity; they distribute and maintain binaries that reinforce their dominance. All molar subjectivities, both those of major and minor terms, are formed in relation to this ‘man-standard,’ as Deleuze and Guattari call it. The consequence of the constitutive force of this ‘man-standard’ is that even those who are part of a minority group must still become minoritarian in order to break with it. Becoming, then, is a process of departing from the standard, the norm, and the dominant pattern, a transformation not just of majoritarian identity but of the minor, which has been defined in relation to it. So, becoming-minoritarian in the form of becoming-woman is not a revaluation of the degraded minor side of the binary, ‘woman,’ but a break from such rigidly dualist terms altogether, which are themselves a product of and in the service of the ‘man-standard.’
In this context, Deleuze and Guattari’s contentious claim that ‘in a way, it is always “man” who is the subject of becoming’ appears less divisive and more explicable; as they go on to clarify, ‘he is only this subject when he enters into a becoming-minoritarian that tears him away from his major identity’ (1987: 291; 1980: 357). ‘Man’ is always the subject of becoming not because only men can become or only men need to undergo such transformative engagements, but rather because it is always with respect to the ‘man-standard’ that defines molar identities that one must deterritorialize. The subject that desubjectifies itself, undoes its constitution in relation to the dominant paradigm, is a subject that has been defined in relation to ‘man.’​[10]​ As a molar woman, one has been defined in relation to, indeed in opposition to, man, one’s femininity in contrast with masculinity.​[11]​ Becoming-woman, therefore, is a process that ruptures the dominance of the ‘man-standard’ around which are constructed our molar identities, which in their oppositionality and rigidity constitute oppressive hierarchies. Consequently, it cannot be undertaken by trying to become like the group ‘women’ by developing ostensibly ‘feminine’ traits; as Deleuze continually emphasizes, becoming bears little relation to resemblance or imitation. 
Paul Patton’s characterization of becoming-woman elaborates on this point quite clearly while also portraying becoming-woman in a way that might bolster some of the criticisms mentioned above. Accordingly, it is worthwhile to quote his account at length: 
Becoming-woman should be understood as a becoming of the same type as becoming-
animal, in the sense that it involves a virtual alliance with the affects and powers that have
been traditionally assigned to women. The reality of the becoming has little to do with a 
relation to real women, but everything to do with a relation to the incorporeal body of 
woman as it figures in the social imaginary. This body might be defined in terms of the 
affects associated with the nurture and protection of others, or the affects associated with 
dependent social status such as a capacity for dissimulation or for cultivating the affection of 
others, delight in appearances and role-play. Becoming-woman does not involve imitating or 
assuming the forms of femininity but rather creating a molecular or micro-femininity in the 
subject concerned by reproducing the characteristic features, movements or affects of what 
passes for ‘the feminine’ in a given form of patriarchal society. (Patton 2000: 81)

Many aspects of this account are quite apt: becoming is a matter of virtual alliance rather than imitation; as a result, it is a question of alliance through impersonal affects rather than personal identification; and, consequently, becoming-woman necessarily involves a relation to ‘the incorporeal body of woman … in the social imaginary’ rather than relationships with particular, actual women. Yet, it remains unclear what it would mean to ‘reproduce the characteristic features, movements or affects of what passes for “the feminine” in a given form of patriarchal society’ in a way that does not simply reproduce molar femininity in a masculine subject. Likewise, this account leaves unanswered what it would mean for women to enter into becoming-woman: how would becoming-woman be a meaningful process of transformation for women if it consisted in reproducing, albeit perhaps as a parody, typical feminine traits? ​[12]​ 
	If the first component of the process of becoming-woman is its status as a type of becoming-minoritarian, then the second key component of this concept is the body and the relationship between the body and the constitution of normalized subjectivity. This aspect of becoming-woman will shed light on the questions just raised. As recounted above, becoming-woman is a process that departs from the dominant paradigm of man and woman, masculine and feminine for alternative ways of being gendered creatures. Thus, it diverges from standard gender/sex models. The concept of becoming-woman, then, must be understood as a response to the way molar sexed subjectivity is formed through the theft of the body and the domestication of bodily affects. 
The sex/gender system that shapes us into molar men and women functions through bodily normalization, that is, through the enforcement of sexual dimorphism (that there are two sexes: male and female) and concomitantly binary systems of gendered meaning (that there are two corresponding sets of gendered roles, attitudes, characteristics: masculine and feminine). Such a system involves taming the body so that it falls in line with the appropriate one of these two options. This ‘theft’ of the body – the teleological organization of its sexual organs, the restriction and channeling of its forces, the molding of its capacities into acceptable patterns – sexes and sexualizes it. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the body – with all its free flowing affects and uncontained movements – is stolen first from the little girl, who subsequently can be held up as model of good-behavior and desirable object to the little boy.​[13]​ A vital part of this normalizing organization is the organization of the sexual organs, the proper codification of the erogenous zones of the body. When the genitals are deemed the appropriate erogenous zones, erotic and sexual activity is both limited to activity between the two sexes and subordinated to reproductive ends. 
As a process that deterritorializes molar men and women, becoming-woman is a way of stealing back the body, stealing it away from the organization that invested it with the forms and norms of sexed subjectivity. If the body has been stolen, becoming-woman is a return to the body and a way of de-structuring the body. By undoing oppositional patterns of sexed corporeality and subjectivity, becoming-woman also unhinges sexuality from the normative and teleological paradigm to which it is confined, promoting the eroticisation of other parts of the body.​[14]​
This last point leads us to the third key idea that helps explicate the concept of becoming-woman. Throughout A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari thematize becoming as a matter of alliance, contagion, and involution in contrast to filiation, heredity, and evolution: what is at stake in becoming is production rather than reproduction. As a matter of alliance rather than filiation and heredity, the ‘nuptials’ of becoming are unnatural ones in the sense that they do not follow the prescribed pattern for sexual reproduction: an association between man and woman that produces offspring. In filial relations and the relations between the sexes for sexual reproduction, ‘the only differences retained are a simple duality between the sexes within the same species, and small modifications across generations’ (1987: 242; 1980: 296). In contrast to this conception, which reduces productive relations to those that take place between two fixed and opposed sexes, the alliances that constitute becoming-woman demand that we think sexual differences and their production differently. If our ways of being sexed and sexualized creatures exceed the binary relations that have structured sexed subjectivity, then the idea of sexual difference need not be thought as binary (male/female) but as a multiplicity of sexual differences. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, there are ‘n sexes’ that are all the myriad ways of living one’s sexuality in one’s body in relation to other bodies (ibid, 277; 340).​[15]​ Lastly, for becoming to be involution rather than evolution entails that it be a process of simultaneous deformation and recreation rather one of progressive formation and development. Becoming-woman thus is a generative process because in forming alternate ‘unnatural nuptials’ it unweaves oppositional and reproductively oriented forms of sexuality and sexed subjectivity.
These last two points of emphasis – that becoming-woman is a matter of loosening the grip of normative sex/gender arrangements on the body and that becoming-woman creates sexual differences outside of these arrangements through its ‘unnatural nuptials’ – clarify the relationship of actual women to this process of becoming-woman. Indeed, if bodily subjection is what is contested and undone through becoming-woman, then it is clear that the concept speaks directly to the conditions in which actual women live rather than viewing them as vehicles for men’s becomings or sweeping them up in a broader movement of transformation. While, as Patton implies, the becoming-woman of a man need not happen in relation to an actual woman (and certainly not in relation to her identity as such) and need not involve a relationship between a man and a woman, the reality of becoming-woman appears to have everything to do with real women. The reality of becoming-woman has to do with women’s bodies and the bodies of men, in relation to whom they are defined, as well as with the capacity of those bodies to experience different connections, to allow bodily affects to flourish in ways unaccounted for by dualist conceptions of sex and sexuality. 
In light of this conceptual contextualization, it appears that the feminist criticism that Deleuze and Guattari are inattentive to women’s specificity is mistaken in at least one respect: the constitution of sexed subjectivity. Although becoming-woman is an abstract concept, it is one through which they intend to embrace singularity precisely by eschewing the generality of two sexes.​[16]​ Likewise, given the way becoming-woman functions in response to the injustice done to women by the theft of the body, it seems unlikely that it would be a concept that would permit women to serve as vehicles for men’s becomings.​[17]​ I have offered an account of becoming-woman that demonstrates that Deleuze and Guattari evince an awareness of and sensitivity to the socio-historical conditions that have shaped female subjectivity, making it in particular the trap they consider all molar identities to be. For this reason as well as for others, the focus on corporeality in becoming-woman should make Deleuze and Guattari’s work more appealing to their critics. Indeed, corporeality has been the aspect of their work that feminist theorists have found most valuable, so it is to this theme, the body, that I now turn in order to investigate in what ways and for what reasons feminist thinkers have found his work to be of value for feminism.
To a significant extent, feminist appropriations of Deleuze’s work have focused on the conceptions of the body and desire it offers and the resources found therein for rethinking sex, sexuality, and gender. In her essay on the unique ‘Australian’ feminism of Moira Gatens, Elizabeth Grosz, and Genevieve Lloyd, Claire Colebrook isolates features of a Spinozist-Deleuzian understanding of the body that are adopted by the three. The picture they draw is one that enables them to depart from the essentialism/constructivism dichotomy in thinking about sex, gender, and sexuality. The (sexed) body is neither a natural given nor is its meaning merely constructed via representations or ideological systems. Instead, the body is a positive, active force, itself productive of meaning, ‘a becoming meaningful’; it is ‘the site of the distribution whereby it becomes as a body’ (Colebrook 2000: 86, 89). The body is not just the locus of becoming but is a becoming and, as such, it is an opening to incalculable linkages and transformations. This conception of the body is quite valuable in devising an alternative understanding of the genesis and status of the sexed body, as is evident in the work of Gatens in particular. Colebrook summarizes this contribution by noting, ‘masculinity and femininity are more than mental or cultural representations; but at the same time they cannot be appealed to as self-present substances or essences given once and for all through certain attributes and qualities’ (2000: 87). In the Deleuzian alternative to subjects/substances and attributes, fixed forms and modes of organization, one finds the resources for thinking the reality of sexed subjectivity and for thinking its future otherwise.  
 This way of thinking sex and sexuality otherwise is enacted by Grosz in much of her work, but especially in the essays collected in Space, Time, and Perversion. In the essay, ‘Refiguring Lesbian Desire,’ she proposes abandoning the conception of desire that has prevailed throughout the history of philosophy as well as in contemporary work in feminist and queer theory – desire conceived as lack – and the psychoanalytic paradigm that is its chief advocate in favor of the Deleuzian view of desire as ‘a force of positive production’ (Grosz 1995: 179). Grosz explains this decision to turn to Deleuze and Guattari’s model by noting ‘that their work does not have to be followed faithfully to be of use in dealing with issues [such as lesbian desire] that they do not … deal with themselves’ (1995: 180). Indeed, insofar as they give us notions that make experimentation central to thought and life, we ought not follow them faithfully but errantly. Their concepts are valuable ‘because they enable desire to be understood not just as feeling or affect, but also as doing and making’ (ibid). Since female desire has been severely circumscribed by an account of desire (as lack) as implicitly male and even ultimately a relation between men, feminists cannot but find useful an alternative that regards desire as creative. Grosz’s subsequent description of how such desire works reveals several other aspects of it that are of interest to feminists. 
Desirous becomings operate at the level of the singular; they are unique not just to individuals but to the becoming itself, which brings into play parts of individuals, fragments of their bodies, affects that take hold of them, and movements that flow through them. As Grosz notes, ‘becomings then are not a broad general trajectory of development, but always concrete and specific’ (1995: 184). Becoming, therefore, cannot overlook the specificity of women since it is precisely a process of engaging various aspects of that specificity. Moreover, a focus on singularity alleviates some of the difficulty feminists have when it comes to theorizing identity. The notion of ‘intersectionality’ in feminist thought expresses the idea that sex or gender is not the only relevant form of difference and that other modes of difference such as race, ethnicity, nationality, and class cannot simply be aggregated, added on top of gender as other discrete factors, but rather intersect and overlap in complex ways. This picture of difference as ‘intersectional’ rather than additive or aggregative coincides significantly with the Deleuzian picture of how difference is generated through the becoming of multiplicities in relation with one another. Indeed, one might claim that Deleuze’s model could add more nuance to feminist thinking about difference because of the way the logic of becoming traverses various levels of social organization – engaging groups, social meanings, sub-individual affects, in addition to individuals – rather than being confined to one (the identity of the individual).​[18]​ 
  Relatedly, becoming is always a matter of relation and connection with otherness. It is, thus, in a sense always ‘intersubjective.’​[19]​ Such intersubjective assemblages are oriented toward creating new ways of living. As Grosz puts it with respect to ‘becoming-lesbian,’ 
            the question is not am I – or are you – a lesbian, but rather, what kinds of lesbian 
connections, what kinds of lesbian-machine, we invest our time, energy, and bodies in, what 
kinds of sexuality we invest ourselves in, with what other kinds of bodies, and to what 
effects? What it is that together, in parts and bites, and interconnections, we can make that is new, exploratory, opens up further spaces, induces further intensities, speeds up, enervates, and proliferates production (production of the body, production of the world)? (1995: 184).

This view of the body and its creative becomings inaugurates, as Colebrook states, ‘an ethics of desire; affirming one’s own becoming is maximized in the affirmation of the becoming of others’ (2000: 88). Such an ethics is one that is oriented toward experimentation, toward inventing more fulfilling, enlivening, and intense ways of thinking, feeling, and relating. Yet, it is not solipsistic – the sovereignty of the self is put into question – nor is it resistant to attentiveness to others; becoming only happens together.
We have seen what feminist thinkers find appealing about Deleuze’s philosophy.​[20]​ While points of affinity between Deleuze and feminism are to be found in the focus on corporeality and bodies as a locus of transformation and resistance to the oppressive demands of normalized subjectivity and the associated demands of conventional morality, one apparent incompatibility arises given that many feminists espouse the need to pay heed to the experience of women qua women and Deleuzian becoming dismantles molar identities such as that of ‘woman.’​[21]​ In light of the aforementioned critiques and worries, some of the aspects of his thought embraced by feminist Deleuzians appear to be precisely those that others might still regard warily. The emphasis placed both on creation, experimentation, and the production of novelty and on the sub- or pre-personal level at which becoming operates might seem to take Deleuze’s concepts ‘out of this world.’​[22]​ In this way, his thought could be deemed unresponsive to particularity, understood as the particularity of subjects: it goes beneath it and thus undermines it. The concern is not the absence of the concrete, perhaps, but the nearly exclusive interest in what surpasses and underlies the personal: ‘a more universalist movement of becoming.’ These specific tensions, I believe, are encompassed by a broader worry on the part of feminist thinkers, which is that the ethos of Deleuze’s philosophy does not advocate responsibility and lacks attentiveness to social, historical context because the insistence on creative deterritorialization and the production of novelty precludes such contextualization and responsiveness.​[23]​ The third and final section of this essay contests this conclusion by elaborating how a Deleuzian ethic might entail the kind of responsiveness feminists (and others) seek.

3. Mapping a Deleuzo-Feminist Ethics

The key, I believe, to mapping a Deleuzian ethics that is of use to feminism is to reveal his work to contain both an ethos and a concept of responsiveness, and one that has the sense both of responsiveness to socio-historical context and of responsiveness to others. Indeed, such a sense of responsiveness is not foreign to his thought, which continually emphasizes it in some form or another. Throughout this section I wish to explore several instances of responsiveness in Deleuze’s work.
	The first major instance of this emphasis is the dynamic of the problem and solution. In its earliest formulation in Difference and Repetition, the problem is an internally differentiated multiplicity the contours of which must be determined in order to generate a solution. Deleuze develops this conception of the problem in response to the sixth postulate of the dogmatic image of thought: that designation or reference is the privileged domain of truth (and falsity). This understanding grounds truth in sense: for a proposition to be judged true or false it must have sense. The domain of sense and of propositions that have sense, however, extends beyond the limits of the true; false statements have sense – they must in order for us to deem them false – as do nonsense words. Yet, the image of thought that locates truth in propositions and takes sense to be the necessary, if not sufficient, condition of truth, also reduces sense to a sterile condition. Sense is an ideality reducible to an attribute of a proposition and the object to which the proposition refers, which are said to have sense. Thus, ‘sense appears here, as the outcome of the most powerful logical effort, but as Ineffecutal, a sterile incorporeal, deprived of its power of genesis’ (Deleuze 1994: 156; 2003: 203). The consequence is that, as the locus of sense, the problem is conceived as merely propositional, as drawn from propositions that might serve as solutions. On this model, the problem is not genuinely productive precisely because it is fixed in the domain of propositions and set up in terms of already comprehensible possible responses.​[24]​
	However, for the problem truly to operate as ground and condition, it must be genuinely productive; it must generate responses rather than itself ‘be traced from the corresponding propositions that serve, or can serve, as responses’ (1994: 157; 2003: 204). For Deleuze, the problem as virtuality is such that it exceeds and persists beyond any particular case of solution to which it gives rise. Problems are not resolved but are that with which we experiment by venturing responses.​[25]​ By seeking to conceive the problem as generative in its own right, as properly transcendental rather than traced from empirically given condition, and by in effect inverting the relation between the problem and the proposition, Deleuze invests the dynamic of the problem and solution with a mode of responsiveness. Since they are not determined in advance, solutions function as genuine responses and must always be responsive to the problem precisely because they take it as their condition. The constant relation to the problems from which they arise is a necessary feature of responses or cases of solution, a necessary feature that prevents them from falling back into the generality of propositions and losing their sense. Deleuze writes, ‘Once we “forget” the problem, we have before us no more than an abstract general solution, and since there is nothing to support that generality, there is nothing to prevent the solution from fragmenting into the particular propositions that form its cases’ (1994: 162; 2003: 211). Thus, it is through their very responsiveness to problems that instances of solution retain their meaningfulness.
Since the problem is a problematic-Idea and responses attest to it in its ideality or virtuality, it might seem that such a notion is far detached from any form of responsiveness to socio-historical conditions or actual others. Yet, this set of ideas regarding the problem and solution finds its ethical correlate in Deleuze’s comment concerning ethics and the event in The Logic of Sense.​[26]​ In this text, responsiveness to the problem becomes responsiveness to the event and is thus explicated further. Here, inspired by the Stoics, he makes one of his most direct pronouncements concerning ethics: ‘either ethics makes no sense at all, or this is what it means and has nothing else to say: not to be unworthy of what happens to us’ (Deleuze 1990: 149; 1969: 174). Occurring as it does in the twenty-first series in the text, that concerning the event, this statement explicates not being unworthy in terms of being worthy of the event, which is to say willing and expressing it. The event is here understood in its duality: it is both what happens, the actual event, and it is the event of sense, a virtual or incorporeal event, not an actual state of affairs or ‘that which occurs’ but that from which ‘that which occurs’ derives its meaning. Thus, there are two aspects of not being unworthy of what happens. Not to be unworthy is both to refrain from ressentiment, instead affirming each event, and to refer ‘that which occurs’ back to the potential for change inherent in the incorporeal event, which imbues ‘that which occurs’ with a sense that exceeds it and constitutes us, the bearers of the event, as open to the future. These two sides of the event and two aspects of willing it are not separate, but concurrent. For an individual to will the event is always to will ‘the embodiment, the actualization of the pure incorporeal event in a state of affairs and in his or her own body, own flesh[,]’ and thus to make the potential of the event operative (1990: 146; 1969: 172). The incorporeal event – the event that is ‘the pure expressed’ – demands to be actualized (1990: 149; 1969: 175). 
In what sense is willing the event, embodying it, a responsive endeavor? First of all, the event or the problem calls for creation and activity. It demands not passive acceptance of what happens but engagement with the sense of what occurs in such a way that out of an understanding of this sense one creates something new that speaks to what has been. To express the power of the event, one cannot merely repeat what has happened. To do so is indeed to be unworthy insofar as it is to reject the generative aspect of the event, to ignore the opening onto the future that it entails. Therefore, an ethical relation to the event is a responsive one precisely because not being unworthy can be defined as creating a new mode of living that grows out of and speaks to the event in its duality.
These two notions – problem and event – find a synthesis of sorts in What is Philosophy? in which philosophical concepts are understood as expressive of the event and as responding to problems by determining and formulating them as well as comprising cases of solution.​[27]​ Philosophy, as the practice of creating concepts, is an ethical activity because it seeks to attest to the event. Concepts are composed as responsive to the event and problem. Crucial to Deleuze and Guattari’s development of the concept of the concept in What is Philosophy? is the idea that ethical modes of life and thought – that is, concept-creation – and must bear a certain relation to the present, to actuality, to the socio-historical conditions in which we find ourselves. This emphasis serves to contextualize the ethos of responsiveness contained in the ideas of expressing the event and responding to the problems.
The account they give of what defines political philosophy and, in particular, the concept of utopia is exemplary of this emphasis on responsiveness to the present. The political notion of utopia is not on Deleuze and Guattari’s account an ideal to which to aspire, but constitutes a form of revolution. More specifically, the concept of ‘utopia is what links philosophy with its own epoch’ and is that through which philosophy ‘takes criticism of its own time to its highest point’ (1994: 99; 1991: 95). The idea of utopia binds the transformative power of the virtual – the event – to that which it transforms; it joins the force of undoing of absolute deterritorialization to the socio-historical conditions of the present. As Deleuze and Guattari note, utopia means ‘absolute deterritorialization but always at the critical point at which it is connected with the present relative milieu, and especially with the forces stifled by this milieu’ (100; 95-96). The becomings that utopia inspires are thus responsive ones, modes not just of creativity but also of critique and resistance. Such becomings can only be creative, can only be critical, because they are responsive, because they productively react against the limiting conditions of the present. Becoming-woman, therefore, is a creative way of taking up, inventing, resisting modes of sexed corporeality because there are modes of sexed subjectivity to which to respond. 
On this understanding, becoming responds to historical conditions and the conditions of the present, but itself is not and cannot be historical. History traffics only in states of affairs, that which has occurred, while becoming is openness to the future and experimentation, which ‘is always that which is in the process of coming about – the new, the remarkable, and interesting…’ (1994: 111; 1991: 106). As Dorothea Olkowski puts it, ‘Although it is true … that Deleuze is not “doing” history, he is not doing it because he insists upon philosophical and concrete specificities, whereas history demands generalities’ (1999: 52). Thus, the critique of becoming-woman that contends that it is too general a concept, one that cannot account for or encompass women’s history and the particularity of their experiences, is not mistaken about Deleuze’s regard for history. Rather, this criticism is mistaken because it fails to acknowledge that it there is a quite particular conception of history and historical temporality at stake for Deleuze, and thus equates concreteness with a generic sense of history. Concreteness is present in Deleuze’s work even in the absence of the temporal fixity that he takes to define history: one need not fix an experience, a process, an event in a determinate moment in time in order to achieve concreteness. It is not that history is irrelevant for Deleuze, but that it is important only as a ‘set of almost negative conditions that make possible the experimentation of something that escapes history’ (1994: 111; 1991: 106).​[28]​ 
While the concept of utopia illuminates for us the way Deleuze’s concept of becoming entails a responsiveness to historical conditions although not definition in terms of it, the notion of responsibility he and Guattari briefly sketch in What is Philosophy? illuminates how becoming is a process that engages us with others and calls for us to be responsive to them. In the context of a criticism of human rights, which ‘say nothing about the immanent modes of existence of people provided with rights[,]’ they write, ‘We are not responsible for the victims but responsible before [devant] them’ (1994: 107, 108; 1991: 103). Responsibility is not nonexistent in Deleuzian ethics, but takes a different form. One is not responsible for others or rather the preposition ‘for’ does not mean ‘“for their benefit,” or yet “in their place.” It is “before.” It is a question of becoming’ (1994: 109; 1990: 105). Responsibility is not a matter of acting for others or acting as if one were the other, of taking upon oneself the task of assuming the other’s projects as if they were one’s own; such modes of responsibility would presume that the self is set off from the other, an autonomous and discrete subject, consciously taking on responsibility. Instead, one is responsible before others, facing them, and in relation to them. As Leonard Lawlor observes, the sense conveyed by the preposition ‘before’ in the phrase being ‘responsible before’ others is that of being among and within the singularities of a multiplicity: ‘I find myself fascinated before something I cannot recognize, before something that has lost its molar form, something singular’ (Lawlor 2008: 176). As a question of becoming, responsibility both involves and demands a certain mode of relationship and engagement with others, and not simply with them as molar entities but with that which composes them. One is responsible because one is in the midst of, linked to, and becoming through something within the other. 
If responsibility is ‘a question of becoming’ and becoming involves the kind of relation that is constitutive of responsibility, then the linkage between these two concepts entails that becoming is an ethical endeavor. In becoming, one expresses, augments, and transforms the capabilities of one’s body through its relation to those of another body; yet, as Paul Patton notes, this assemblage is formed without ‘involving [the] appropriation of those powers’ or hindering the other’s ability to express itself (Patton 2000: 79). Deleuze’s comments concerning the problem of evil in Spinoza’s ontology of bodies clarify this point:
What is positive or good in the act of beating? Spinoza asks. What is good is that this act (raising my arm, closing my fist, moving rapidly and forcefully) expresses a power of my body; it expresses what my body can do in a certain relation. What is bad in this act? The bad appears when the act is associated with the image of a thing whose relation is decomposed by that very act (I kill someone by beating him). The same act would have been good if it had been associated with the image of a thing whose relation agreed with it (e.g., hammering iron). Which means that an act is bad whenever it directly decomposes a relation, whereas it is good whenever it directly compounds its relation with other relations. (Deleuze 1988: 35)

To be responsible, on this understanding, is to refrain from connecting one’s body with other bodies in ways that decompose the relations that constitute them or diminish their powers, and instead to find compositions with others that enhance the powers of both. Becoming, therefore, involves a measure of responsiveness to others that precludes it from rendering women the mere vehicles of men’s becomings. The responsibility inherent in becoming requires, rather, that men become-woman in a way that does not reterritorialize women’s bodies and selves but facilitates women’s own becomings.
	While one conception of response and responsiveness lies in the conceptual nexus of the problem-event and response, and another in the associated understanding of responsive becoming, another instance of responsiveness in Deleuze's work lies in the emergence of the themes of caution, sobriety, and meticulousness in A Thousand Plateaus. The idea that caution and sobriety are a vital part of becoming further demonstrates how it is a responsive process. In plateau six, ‘How Do You Make Yourself a Body without Organs,’ Deleuze and Guattari note that ‘three great strata … directly bind us: the organism, signifiance, and subjectification’ (1987: 159; 1980: 197). These layers of structure organize the body into its purportedly natural organization, language and meaning into pregiven forms of understanding (via interpretation), and the self into normative modes of subjectivity. Becoming or making oneself a body without organs is a way of disordering the body, breaking dominant patterns of meaning, and desubjectifying the self. Yet, Deleuze and Guattari claim that ‘caution is the art common to all three[,]’ the art that prevents these processes of becoming from turning dangerously destructive, from ‘sinking into the unreal, the illusory, the unmade, the unprepared[,]’ and from losing the thread that connects them to reality (ibid 160; 198).
Becoming, they imply, is not haphazard or uncontrolled, but cautious and, in certain ways, planned and deliberate. A telos is absent from the concept of becoming, thus it is not planned in the sense in of being mapped out in advance in order to achieve some particular end. Rather, to avoid ‘sinking into … the unprepared[,]’ becoming must involve preparation in the sense of a planning a mode of attack, a style, a form of engagement. One knows not where the process will lead or what affects it will produce, but one must know in relation to which strata and which forms of organization one seeks to become. Deleuze and Guattari make this point by noting that ‘you have to keep small supplies of signifiance and interpretation, if only to turn them against their own systems when the circumstances demand it, when things, persons, even situations, force you to; and you have to keep small rations of subjectivity in sufficient quantity to enable you to respond to the dominant reality’ (ibid 160; 199). As a process of construction, of making rather than descending into the entirely ‘unmade,’ becoming is laying out and following a ‘meticulous relation’ with this dominant reality (ibid 161; 199). Only through such a relation with the norms and forms of subjectivity that one seeks to evade and subvert is one able to do so. This type of relation is one in which ‘you respond to the dominant reality.’ Ignoring it, moving away from it too quickly or too incautiously is a recipe for a destructive rather than constructive becoming. Thus, we see that becoming presents a response to actual conditions, precluding obliviousness to them.  




A Deleuzian ethos, therefore, does not necessarily entail an unconcerned and detached mode of creativity, one that lacks attentiveness to the exigencies of present-day life and the specificity of sexed experience, in particular. By reconsidering Deleuze’s work from the perspective of a sympathetic feminist critic, we can emphasize alternate webs of concepts and devise new points of connection that reveal different ways of thinking about Deleuze’s ethics. While many feminist readers of Deleuze have embraced and adopted his (and Guattari’s) way of conceiving the body and desire precisely because these conceptions allow for an openness and creativity that other models of desire and sexed corporeality do not, I have tried to emphasize another array of concepts that may also be of value to feminists. In particular, the theme of responsiveness, which is subtly emphasized throughout Deleuze’s work, can alleviate feminists’ concerns about the character of becoming-woman by revealing becoming not to be a detached process of self-creation that authorizes obliviousness to others but to be a process that is grounded in relations with others and enables us to transform those relations. 






^1	 Notes1. As Rosemarie Tong’s Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on ‘Feminist Ethics’ elaborates, feminist ethics has a history that predates contemporary thought. See the section on ‘Feminist Ethics: Historical Background,’ Tong 2009.
^2	 2. See Held 1990.
^3	 3. Alison Jaggar’s ‘Feminist Ethics: Projects, Problems, Prospects’ clearly details the history, the central concerns, and the animating questions of the field of feminist ethics. See Jaggar 1991.  
^4	 4. Pragmatist approaches to ethics would also likely fit this general description (especially regarding the first two points mentioned below), yet, as I intend to elucidate in what follows, Deleuzian and feminist ethics may have certain critical concerns in common that pragmatism – broadly construed – does not necessarily share. Likewise, Deleuzian approaches and pragmatic approaches may share a focus on the value of experimentation that many feminists would not automatically adopt. These further parallels in method and concern are the subject for a different study, however.
^5	 5. See Brennan 1999. 
^6	 6. For many, feminist ethics is ‘synonymous with an ethics of care[,]’ but given that many feminist ethicists are critical of care ethics or seek to prioritize concepts besides ‘care’ I will treat care ethics as one dimension of feminist thinking about ethics (Jaggar 1991: 83). For critical accounts of care ethics, see Tronto 1987 and Jaggar 1995.
^7	 7. See Irigaray 1985: 140-141 for an oft-referenced version of these criticisms. See Goulimari 1999 for a valuable assessment of these critiques as they are exemplified in the work of Alice Jardine and Rosi Braidotti. Chapter two, ‘Can a Feminist Read Deleuze and Guattari?,’ of Olkowski 1999 also addresses Jardine’s criticisms and those of Judith Butler in her Subjects of Desire quite well.
^8	 8. Grosz herself expresses this concern a few pages earlier with respect to Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the figure of the girl: ‘The girl’s specificity, her body, is once again robbed, this time not by the anonymous ‘they’ of the earlier passage but by Deleuze and Guattari who render it equivalent to a generalized and indeterminate in-betweenness, a transgressive movement in itself’ (Grosz 1994: 175).
^9	 9. If we were to speculate about this, we might say that becoming-woman is accorded a unique role – as ‘the key to all the other becomings’ – precisely because it is a process that undoes the bodily subjection that produces two diametrically opposed forms of sexed subjectivity - male and female - by normalizing a certain reproductively-oriented organization of sexed bodies (1987: 277; 1980: 340). This account of becoming-woman will be elaborated in what follows.It is perhaps in this respect that becoming-woman must be the first becoming, the process through which all others must pass; for any other becoming (becoming-animal, becoming-molecular, becoming-imperceptible), one must first become less rigidly lodged in one’s subjectivity and, correspondingly, in one’s body taken as an organism with specific purposes and proper ways of functioning in accord with those purposes.
^10	 10. When they further note, ‘There is no subject of becoming except as a deterritorialized variable of he majority, and there is no medium of becoming except as a deterritorialized variable of the minority[,]’ it is clear that subject of becoming is not necessarily a man but rather the elements of our identities that are ‘variable[s] of the majority’ (1987: 292; 1980: 357). 
^11	 11. Feminist thinkers of various stripes, most notably Simone de Beauvoir and Luce Irigaray, have long made the point that female identity has always been understood and defined (by both men and women) in opposition and as lacking in relation to male identity, and thus that women have not genuinely had their own identity.  
^12	 12. Nor does it seem that becoming-woman by ‘becoming-stereotypically-feminine’ is the best way to contest the seeming givenness of oppositional sex/gender difference and create a sensibility able to disrupt a binary sex/gender system (indeed, it would seem to buy into the idea that nurture, superficiality, docility, coyness, and playfulness are proper to women, and can be taken up by men only in an unnatural process of alteration). 
^13	 13. Regardless of whether or not it is developmentally accurate to claim that female children are subjected to this kind of training before male children, it does seem to be the case that normative gender development is a harder route for girls than it is for boys. The psychoanalytic story of the female child’s development illustrates this point: on Freud’s account, the female child has particular developmental difficulties because of the necessity of shifting her primary object choice from the mother to a male in order to accord with a norm of heterosexuality. Since the first object of attachment for both male and female children is female (the mother), male children take a woman as an analogous love object fairly easily whereas female children must shift from loving a woman to loving a man. The female body must also be reterritorialized so that the primary erotic zone is the vagina, not the clitoris; no such reterritorialization of the male body is required. De Beauvoir’s account of female development in the Second Sex also clearly describes the troublesome nature of becoming a (molar) woman. The restrictions on movement, emphasis on ‘proper’ behavior and dress, and limits on envisaging and undertaking creative endeavors all make female subjectivity perhaps more restrictive than male. Iris Marion Young’s essay ‘Throwing Like a Girl’ updates this kind of account from a Merleau-Pontian perspective.
^14	 14. Paola Marrati also reads Deleuze on sexuality in this way. See the last section, ‘On Sexual Difference,’ in Marrati 2006.
^15	 15. In relation to the second point central to understanding becoming-women (the body as the terrain for normalizing subjectivity), the myriad ways of living one’s sexuality in one’s body are tied neither to reproductively oriented sexual or to genitally focused activity. Eroticism is decoupled from purpose – reproduction or, equally teleological, orgasm – and proper locale, although it may remain localized in particular bodily zones. In this context, sexual differences multiply to the extent that diverse modes of desire and sensation proliferate; there are ‘n sexes’ because the configurations of bodies, desires, sensations, movements, etc are innumerable, indeed, incalculable. This idea of a multiplicity of sexual differences, ‘n sexes,’ also finds expression in the work of Cixous and Derrida.  See Cixous’ essay ‘Sorties’ in Cixous and Clément 2001, and Derrida 1985: 167, 183-185.
^16	 16. It is abstract in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense of abstract as a virtual movement linking diverse features; the ‘abstract machine,’ for instance, ‘connects a language to the semantic and pragmatic contents of statements, to collective assemblages of enunciation, to a whole micropolitics of the social field’ (1987: 7; 1980: 14, Cf. 252; 308).
^17	 17. The third concern – about a more universal movement of becoming – will be addressed in the next, the third, section. 
^18	 18. To pursue this claim fully would require an entirely different paper, so I can only mention it here.
^19	 19. Something like ‘inter-sub-subjective’ might be a more accurate, albeit also more unwieldy, term since we are not talking about connections between subjects per se, but among the more minute parts of those constituted subjects.
^20	 20. This brief synopsis cannot do justice to the diversity and richness of feminist work on Deleuze or influenced by him. For further Deleuzian inspired feminist thought consider, among others, the following: Braidotti 1994, Buchanan and Colebrook 2000, Gatens 1996, 2000, Grosz 2004, Marrati 2006, Marsden 2004, Olkowski 1999, 2007, Lorraine 1999.
^21	 21. Deleuze and Guattari acknowledge the necessity of feminist politics organized around a molar identity: ‘It is, of course, indispensable for women to conduct a molar politics, with a view to winning back their own organism, their own history, their own subjectivity’ (1987: 276; 1980: 338). Yet, they also warn of the danger of remaining within such an identity.
^22	 22. As Peter Hallward claims in his recent book, Out of this World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation. My review of Hallward contests this claim. See Hallward 2006, Gilson 2009. 
^23	 23. On this point see Hallward 2006 and Braidotti 2003. Rosalyn Diprose suggests that Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of the concept and the becoming of the concept via the philosopher in What is Philosophy? entails ‘little consideration of how the history of the philosopher’s social experiences (their encounters with other social beings) informs the production of concepts’ (Diprose 2000: 120). 
^24	 24. This claim is a more general version of Deleuze’s analysis, which elaborates both natural and philosophical illusions of the seventh postulate of the dogmatic image: ‘We always find the two aspects of the illusion: the natural illusion that involves tracing problems from supposedly preexistent propositions, logical opinions, geometrical theorems, algebraic equations, physical hypotheses, transcendental judgments; and the philosophical illusion that involves evaluating problems according to their ‘solvability’, in other words, according to the extrinsic and variable form of their possibility of solution’ (1994: 161; 2003: 209-210).
^25	 25. Thus, he shifts truth and falsity from the realm of designation or reference to that of problems themselves, as productive instances: ‘Far from being concerned with solutions, truth and falsity primarily affect problems’ (1994: 159; 2003: 206). Poorly posed problems are themselves false, generating false solutions while original, creative problems are true problems that generate corresponding kinds of solutions: ‘A solution always has the truth that it merits according to the problem to which it responds, and the problem always has the solution that it merits according to its own truth or falsity, that is to say, according to its sense’ (1994: 159; 2003: 206).
^26	 26. John Sellars presents a very clear explanation of the ethics of the event, emphasizing the link Deleuze makes between Stoicism and Nietzschen amor fati and assessing the extent to which Deleuze’s version of Stoicism is consonant with Stoic ethics itself. See Sellars 2006.
^27	 27. On the relation between the concept and event, Deleuze and Guattari state, ‘It is a concept that apprehends the event, its becoming, its inseparable variations. … In its production and reproduction, the concept has the reality of a virtual, of an incorporeal, of an impassible …’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 158-159; 1991: 150). Regarding the problem and concept, they note that ‘all concepts are connected to problems without which they would have no sense and which can themselves only be isolated or understood as their solution emerges’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 16; 1991: 22). 
^28	 28. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari conceive the relationship between change – in the form of becoming – and history as one in which processes of becoming pull away from the determinacy of history, turning away from it not in order to dispense with it but to exceed it, reinvigorating the present with ‘an unhistorical element.’ They write, for instance, that ‘Philosophy cannot be reduced to its own history, because it continually wrests itself from this history in order to create new concepts that fall back into history but do not come from it. How could something come from history?  Without history, becoming would remain indeterminate and unconditioned, but becoming is not historical. … The event itself needs becoming as an unhistorical element’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 96; 1991: 92).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